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Argument strength is revealed when one argument attacks another: a stronger
argument can resist the attack of a weaker1. An abstract argumentation frame-
work comprises a set of arguments and a binary attack relation on those argu-
ments. Strengths have been represented by assigning each argument a weight
(e.g. [1]) or associating the arguments with a ranking, a pre-order on the set of
arguments (e.g. [10])2. But whether an argument A defeats an argument B is
not a simple matter. A number of different aspects of the arguments need to be
considered, especially in the context of decision making, deliberation and practi-
cal reasoning, which will be my focus in this paper. We must take account of all
these various aspects, which means that a single ordering does not adequately
capture argument strength if there are several potential audiences.
Consider the arguments We should raise taxes to reduce inequality and We
should not raise taxes as people have a right to spend their money as they wish.
Which is stronger? I would say the former and Boris would say the latter. It is
a matter of the values to which one subscribes. Or consider P is true because
Ludwig Wittgenstein says so and P is false because Ayn Rand says so. Which is
stronger? I would say the former and Sajid would say the latter. It is a matter of
1 This is the notion used in extensions to Dung’s abstract frameworks [14] designed
to accommodate preferences, e.g. [1] and [6], where attacks are resolved before the
admissible extensions are determined. Here I adopt this view that strength relates to
comparison of individual arguments, sometimes termed ranking-based semantics. I
argue, however, that a single, objectively applicable, ranking is inadequate, and that
the relative strengths of arguments vary according to audiences and contexts. An
alternative is to consider and compare sets of arguments, identifying the admissible
extensions and then choosing between extensions on the basis of an aggregation of
the strengths of the arguments they contain (e.g. [13]). This would facilitate treat-
ment of cumulative attacks and accrual. It is also possible to combine the approaches,
so as to secure benefits from them both [9]. None the less the variety of aspects iden-
tified in this paper that should be considered when assessing strengths of individual
arguments are also relevant to the assessment of sets of arguments, which, in the
context of practical reasoning, may be seen as plans or programmes of action.
2 The arguments may be ranked with reference to a property of the arguments, such
as the value they promote [6], or the concern they address [11]. In this paper I use
“values” as in Value Based Argumentation Frameworks [6]. More recently, others,
perhaps most notably Hunter and his colleagues (e.g. [11]), have used “concerns”
rather than “values”. Although they have different connotations, functionally these
play exactly the same role: they are what actions are performed for the sake of, the
reasons why certain states of affairs are considered goals [3], and different audiences
order them differently. Which term is better depends on the context: “values” is
perhaps more appropriate for legal and moral debates, whereas “concerns” is perhaps
more appropriate in matters such as persuasion to adopt a healthier diet.
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which authority one respects. Or We should φ because the reward is substantial
and We should not φ because we are risking a lot. Which is stronger? I would
say the latter but Rishi would say the former. It depends on one’s degree of risk
aversion. As well as risk aversion there is loss aversion3. Whereas risk aversion
leads us to prefer the certain promotion of a less important value to the uncertain
promotion of a more important value, loss aversion leads us to prefer avoiding
the demotion of a lesser value to the promotion of a more important one. Risk
aversion can also arise with respect to a single value, if degrees of promotion
are allowed so that one action may strongly promote a value while another
action may weakly promote that value. Degrees of promotion are considered
in [12]. These four aspects may not be exhaustive, but suffice to show that
which argument is considered stronger will depend on the aspirations, judgement
and temperament of the audience, and that characterising audiences by a single
aspect, such as values as in [6], is an over simplification. Audiences will disagree
and their disagreement is not irrational: there is no sure route to agreement.
Moreover, in practical reasoning there is no right answer determined by the
actual facts: what is right for one person may be wrong for another.
Nor does conflict arise only between audiences. People may be confronted by
advice from a trusted authority which goes against their current value ordering
or which suggests more risk taking than is desired. But the various aspects have
no fixed preference order. Which argument is considered stronger on a particular
occasion is revealed by the choice, but the choice depends on which aspect is
given more importance by that audience on that occasion. Moreover, there is no
reason to think that people will make the same decision every time they are
confronted with a particular choice. Sometimes one feels lucky and is willing to
accept risks that would be avoided on other days.
Of course, it would be possible to abstract all these very different consider-
ations into a single set of weights or ranking, just as different kinds of attack
are abstracted into a single relation in standard abstract argumentation. For
example, the expected utility of an action can be calculated with respect to val-
ues as in [4], and then adjusted according to the current degree of risk and loss
aversion. But whereas attacks can be objectively determined by a consideration
of the structures of the arguments concerned, so that the abstract framework
remains generally applicable, the abstracted weights will apply only to a sin-
gle audience in a particular context, since people frequently reorder their values
(e.g. [18]), and their attitudes to risk and loss will vary. Moreover the aspect
they emphasise may vary also. Any unified ranking of argument strength thus
lacks general applicability: it may be useful for a single instance of problem
solving for a particular audience, but is likely to change when the next problem
is addressed. Whether an argument resists the attack of another is a question
3 Sometime matters such as risk and loss aversion are handled through choice of
strategy, as in [16] where optimistic agents adopt a Maximax strategy while pes-
simistic agents adopt a Maximin strategy. These strategies are, however, selecting
the strongest argument for the agent concerned, and so these considerations remain
an aspect of argument strength.
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answered according to the specific audience and the particular decision mak-
ing context. Thus the strength of an argument is not a persistent property, but
should be determined afresh each time a conflict arises.
The fact that a variety of factors influence the subjective strength of argu-
ments has important consequences for deliberation and persuasion concerning
actions. Whereas [5] considered only values, a general account will have to con-
sider these other aspects also. In deliberation a consensus must be reached on
values, authorities and acceptable degrees of risk and loss: in persuasion the
persuadee can determine all these aspects. In both cases arguments about the
orderings on values [8] and the other aspects may be required to achieve success.
Exploring these different aspects of strength requires both technical and em-
pirical investigation. With regard to technical matters, the different strengths
for a variety of audiences with respect to values have long been represented in
a single framework using Value Based Argument Frameworks (VAF) [6]. VAFs
improved on Preference Based Frameworks [1] by representing a variety of audi-
ences in the framework, rather than considering only a single preference ordering.
What is now needed is a framework able to accommodate not only values but all
the various aspects which motivate audience preferences. VAFs have been com-
bined with an ordering on sources in [2]. This was applied to legal arguments,
where value based arguments relating to the social purposes of the law must be
considered alongside arguments based on the testimony of different witnesses and
different legal authorities. To combine theoretical and practical reasoning value
based frameworks were combined with standard argumentation frameworks in
[15]. The techniques used in these papers could be extended to include the other
aspects of argument strength identified above. Perhaps the most promising way
to handle the matter would be through metalevel argumentation frameworks
[17], wherein preferences relating to the different aspects can be seen as the
source of arguments attacking the attacks between object level arguments.
However, perhaps more important is a detailed investigation of the different
sources of argument strength and how they interact in practice. A fertile area
in which to look at such aspects is provided by US Supreme Court decisions. In
a Supreme Court case both sides present their arguments in the oral hearing.
The justices must then decide which arguments they find stronger and give a
detailed justification for their choice in their opinion. Moreover, where there is
disagreement, different justices can write their own opinions, some concurring
and some dissenting. A particularly fertile case is Furman v Georgia, where all
nine justices wrote an opinion. This case was modelled in [7], with the emphasis
on values. Extending this model to include the other aspects will provide an
interesting case study of how questions of relative strength should be handled.
For example, there is an explicit conflict between the authority of precedents and
the current ordering of social values. One Justice, Marshall, concluded that “stare
decisis would bow to changing values”, whereas Chief Justice Burger argued that
the decision in McGautha v. California should be followed, irrespective of any
consideration of values. Examining the arguments which led to their different
conclusions will give insight into how these two aspects interact.
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